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Whether reward can accentuate the perception of
visual objects, that is, makes them appear larger than
they really are, is a long-standing and controversial
question. Here, we revisit this issue with a novel two-
alternative forced-choice paradigm combining
asymmetric reward schedule and task reversal. In a
first experiment, participants (n ¼ 27) choose the
larger of two unequally rewarded objects in some
sessions and the smaller one in other sessions.
Response biases toward the most rewarding object
differ significantly between the reversed tasks,
revealing an influence of reward on perceived sizes. In
a second experiment, participants (n ¼ 27) indicate
either the brighter or darker object. In contrast with
the first experiment, response biases are similar
between those reversed tasks, indicating that the
perceived luminance is immune to reward
manipulation. Together, these results reveal that if two
objects are associated with different amounts of
reward, participants will perceive the more rewarded
object to be slightly larger, but not brighter, than the
less rewarded one.
Introduction
In 1947, Jerome Bruner and Cecile Goodman
published ‘‘Value and need as organizing factors in
perception,’’ in which they reported that 10-year-old
children tend to largely overestimate the size of coins
but not that of similarly sized wooden disks. The effect
was stronger for coins of higher monetary value and
further pronounced among the poorest children,
leading the authors to claim that value and need trigger
the perceptual accentuation of desirable objects. This
seminal work ignited the ‘‘New Look’’ movement, a
collective effort among psychologists for collecting
evidences that perception is penetrated by affective,
motivational, and cognitive factors, rather than im-
mune to them (Bruner, 1957). The movement progres-
sively vanished in the 70s, with the rise of criticisms
pointing both weaknesses in the experimental findings
and biases in their interpretation. However, the last two
decades have witnessed a strong resurgence of the
debate around the ideas advocated by the ‘‘New Look’’
movement (Balcetis & Lassiter, 2010; Firestone &
Citation: Rima, S., Poujade, M., Maniglia, M., & Durand, J.-B. (2018). Rewarding objects appear larger but not brighter. Journal of
Vision, 18(7):9, 1–10, https://doi.org/10.1167/18.7.9.
Journal of Vision (2018) 18(7):9, 1–10 1
https://doi.org/10 .1167 /18 .7 .9 ISSN 1534-7362 Copyright 2018 The AuthorsReceived October 17, 2017; published July 18, 2018
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Downloaded From: https://jov.arvojournals.org/pdfaccess.ashx?url=/data/journals/jov/937359/ on 08/24/2018
Scholl, 2016). Among the studies most directly related
to the seminal work of Bruner and Goodman, one
study claims that objects useful for reaching a goal look
bigger (Veltkamp, Aarts, & Custers, 2008). Others, in
the same vein, report that muffins appear larger to
food-primed dieters (van Koningsbruggen, Stroebe, &
Aarts, 2011) and women’s breast to sex-primed men
(Den Daas, Ha¨fner, & de Wit, 2013). Rewarding
objects might also look closer (Balcetis & Dunning,
2010) and more salient in ambiguous figures (Balcetis &
Dunning, 2006). Altogether, those few example studies
seem to confirm a task independent perceptual accen-
tuation hypothesis.
However, those conclusions have been questioned on
the ground that these studies report an influence of
reward on the participants’ behavioral responses rather
than on perception per se (Firestone & Scholl, 2016).
Current theories of perceptual decision making con-
sider that behavioral responses result from a two-stage
process (Green & Swets, 1966; Krantz, 1969; Bogacz,
Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Ratcliff &
McKoon, 2008), with the collection of perceptual
evidences (sensory processing) followed by an estima-
tion process. Consequently, the fact that participants
tend to overestimate the size of a rewarding object
reflects an accentuation that arises either at the
perceptual level (i.e., the object is seen larger than what
it actually is) or at the decisional level (i.e., the object is
estimated as being larger than how it is actually seen).
As noted by Firestone and Scholl (2016), this second
alternative is more likely in the context of simple
perceptual decision-making tasks such as those used in
most of the above-mentioned studies. In the tasks used
by these previous studies, participants produce re-
sponses supposedly reflecting what they perceive.
Nevertheless, they are neither penalized for perceptu-
ally inaccurate responses nor rewarded for accurate
ones. Consequently, participants can develop decisional
biases that decouple perceptual evidences and behav-
ioral responses without consequence for the task
outcome.
In the present study, we revisit the perceptual
accentuation hypothesis in two experiments asking
whether rewarding objects are actually perceived larger
(Experiment 1) and brighter (Experiment 2) than less
rewarding ones. Both experiments rely on a new
approach designed to overcome the above-mentioned
limitations. On the one hand, it encourages the
production of perceptually accurate responses, and on
the other hand, it dissociates the respective contribu-
tion of the perceptual and decisional levels. This
approach uses a two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC)
paradigm, which is a performance-based procedure
known to discourage decisional biases and to promote
accuracy (MacMillan & Creelman, 1991). Crucially,
each participant performed reversed versions of the
2AFC task. In Experiment 1, participants indicate the
larger between two discs in some sessions and the
smaller one in others. In Experiment 2, they indicate
the brighter disc in some sessions and the darker one in
others. In all those tasks, we manipulated reward by
allocating distinct amounts of monetary gain for the
two alternatives: Gains for correct responses towards
one of the discs were higher than those for correct
responses towards the other. Perceptual accentuation
posits that regardless of the task, the more rewarded
alternative should be perceived larger and potentially
brighter. With our task reversal, this implies that the
more rewarded alternative should be favored in the
larger/brighter tasks and disadvantaged in the smaller/
darker tasks.
To illustrate how this ‘‘task-reversal’’ 2AFC (TR-
2AFC) paradigm disentangles the respective contribu-
tions of perception and decision in reward-induced
response biases, we consider the case of two discs
simultaneously presented to the left and right of a
central fixation cross. The discs differ only in that the
right one (R*) is associated with a higher promise of
reward. In such a case, perceptual evidences are
assumed to form a centered Gaussian distribution
whose width reflects the noise associated with the
perceptual discrimination process. If participants per-
form the task without considering the reward asym-
metry (no bias hypothesis; upper row in Figure 1), the
decision criterion will also be centered, resulting in
equal probabilities of selecting R* or L and no response
bias (Dp ¼ pR*  pL¼ 0), irrespective of the task
(‘‘larger/brighter?’’ vs. ‘‘smaller/darker?’’). If the reward
manipulation does not affect perception but induces a
reward-optimization strategy (decision bias hypothesis;
second row), the decision criterion would be shifted
(Bogacz et al., 2006), thus increasing the probability of
selecting R* and producing similar response biases in
the reversed tasks. By contrast, the perceptual accen-
tuation hypothesis posits that R* is actually perceived
larger/brighter than L, implying a shift of the
perceptual evidences (perceptual bias hypothesis; third
row). Consequently, the probability of choosing R*
increases in the bigger/brighter tasks, but it decreases in
the smaller/darker tasks, producing opposite response
biases between the reversed tasks. Finally, both
decision and perceptual biases could coexist (both
biases hypothesis; fourth row). They would exert
additive actions in the bigger/brighter tasks but
antagonist actions in the smaller/darker tasks, thus
causing more important response biases toward R* in
the larger/brighter tasks than in the smaller/darker
tasks. Note that for clarity, decision and perceptual
biases are assumed to be of equal strength in Figure 1.
However, this is not necessary for distinguishing the
different alternatives. Pure decision or perceptual
biases predict response biases of equal magnitude in the
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reversed tasks, but with either the same or opposite
signs respectively. Whatever their relative magnitude,
the presence of both decisional and perceptual biases is
marked by a higher response bias in the larger/brighter
tasks than in the smaller/darker ones.
By using the TR-2AFC paradigm, we will show that
reward-induced response biases indicate the presence of
both perceptual and decision biases when discriminat-
ing the size of objects (Experiment 1), whereas only the
decision bias operates when discriminating their
luminance (Experiment 2). These results reveal that
more rewarded objects are perceived slightly larger
than less rewarded ones, in agreement with the
perceptual accentuation hypothesis. They also show
that perceptual accentuation is much weaker than that
described in previous studies and that it does not
extend into the luminance domain.
Material and methods
Participants
Fifty-four participants aged between 20 and 30 years
old participated in the present study. Twenty-seven
participants (nine males, 18 females) were involved in
the first experiment on size discrimination and other
twenty-seven (15 males, 12 females) participated in the
second experiment on luminance discrimination. All
participants were volunteers and declared having
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were naı¨ve
about the purpose of the experiment, and we only
informed them about the task to perform and that the
total amount of earned money would depend on their
performances in the task. The monetary gains ranged
from 13 euros/session for performances at chance level
to 26 euros/session for optimal performance. All
participants signed an informed consent form contain-
ing all those details. The experiment met the ethical
standards of the Helsinki Declaration and was ap-
proved by our local ethic committee (CLERIT).
Apparatus
Participants sat in a chair, legs uncrossed, hands on a
table, within a dark experimental box. They positioned
their heads within a head-support device clamped on
top of the table and equipped with both chin and
forehead supports. The uprights were further covered
with sheets of dense foam in order minimize head
movements during the experiment. Participants faced a
Figure 1. The task-reversal two-alternative forced choice (TR-2AFC) procedure. For both the size and luminance discrimination tasks,
the response toward the left (L) or right (R) alternative results from a decision criterion (in red) applied to the collected perceptual
evidences (in yellow). When the alternatives cannot be perceptually told apart, a higher promise of reward attached to one of them
(R*) can produce distinct scenarios, presented in the left column.We illustrate the underlying actions on the decision criterion and/or
the perceptual evidences for the reversed tasks in the two central columns. The right column shows the outcomes for the different
hypotheses, in terms of response biases (the probability of selecting the more rewarded alternative versus the less rewarded one).
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screen subtending 4483 268 of visual angle at a viewing
distance of 63 cm, with a resolution of 1,9203 1,080
pixels and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The experiment was
controlled by the EventIDE software (OkazoLab),
running on an Intel Core i5 based computer. A video-
based binocular eye tracker (Eye Link 1000 plus)
placed 35 cm in front of the participants was used to
record binocular eye movements at 1 kHz per eye
during the experiment.
Experiment 1: Size discrimination
Each of the 27 participants involved in the first
experiment performed four distinct sessions across
different days, as illustrated in Figure 2 (left panels). In
two successive sessions, participants indicated in each
trial the larger of two simultaneously presented discs.
In the two remaining sessions, they had to indicate the
smaller of the discs. We alternated the order of those
reversed tasks between participants. For both tasks, we
attached the higher monetary reward to the left
alternative in one session and to the right alternative in
the other session, to dissociate reward-induced re-
sponse biases from potential leftward or rightward
response biases. High and low amount of reward
corresponded to 5 and 1 cents of euro for each correct
trial, respectively. The white discs (180 cd/m2) appeared
on a gray background (30 cd/m2) and were positioned
68 to the left and to the right of the central fixation
cross. Across trials, their diameter differed by 2%, 4%,
8%, or 16% (mean diameter of 68), with equal
probability for the larger and smaller discs to be
located rightward and leftward (50%).
Each session started with the calibration of the eye
tracker. At the beginning of each trial, the participants
had to maintain fixation on a central fixation cross for
a period jittering randomly between 1,500 and 3,000
ms. Successful fixation was followed by the simulta-
neous appearance of the two alternatives (i.e., the two
discs) that remained on the screen. Participants had
2,300 ms to move their gaze toward the chosen disc
(i.e., the larger or smaller one, depending on the task).
Beyond this time limit, the trial was aborted, and a text
indicating to the participants that they were too late
was shown for 500 ms. We signaled correct trials with
an image depicting a 5-cents coin or a 1-cent coin,
depending on the reward associated with the chosen
disc. We accompanied the image with the sound of a
cash machine, either brief or long depending on the
small or high monetary gain. Incorrect trials were
marked by the image of a stop sign and the sound of a
buzzer, indicating the absence of gain. A new trial was
initiated 200 ms after that feedback. Each session
consisted of six blocks of 72 trials (nine repetitions of
each condition per block). Participants were free to rest
between each block.
Experiment 2: Luminance discrimination
As for the first experiment, each of the 27
participants involved in the second experiment per-
formed four distinct sessions with task reversal
(‘‘brighter’’ vs. ‘‘darker’’ disc) and reward asymmetry
reversal, as shown in Figure 2 (right panels). The discs
had a fixed diameter of 68 of visual angle. Their
luminance varied pseudorandomly across trials, by 2%,
8%, 16%, or 32% (mean luminance of 155 cd/m2), with
equal probability for the brighter and darker discs to be
located rightward and leftward (50%). As for the first
experiment, each session consisted of six blocks of 72
trials (nine repetitions of each experimental condition
per block). Participants were free to rest between each
block.
Figure 2. Experimental design. For both the size discrimination task (left) and the luminance discrimination task (right), participants
performed four distinct sessions. In two successive sessions, they had to indicate the larger/brighter disc (in blue); and in the two
other sessions, they had to indicate the smaller/darker one (in green). For each of these reversed tasks, the more rewarding disc was
the right one in one session (upper row) and in the left one in the other session (lower row).
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Data analysis
For each participant and each session, we discarded
the first of the six blocks, considered as a training
block. We constructed psychometric curves from the
five remaining blocks by computing the proportion of
rightward saccades for each experimental condition
(i.e., for each difference in size or luminance between
the discs). Those psychometric curves were then
parametrized by fitting them with a cumulative
Gaussian function (Wichmann & Hill, 2001) of the
form:
Y ¼ g þ 1 g  lð Þ3 0:5
3 1þ erf X  lð Þffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2 : s2ð Þp
 ! !
where Y is the proportion of rightward saccades, X is
the difference in size or luminance expressed as a
percentage, g and l denote deviations of the curves’
floor and ceiling from 0 and 1 respectively, while l and
s represent the mean and standard deviation of the
error function (erf). Those last two parameters are
closely related to the point of subjective equality (PSE;
i.e., the condition for which the two alternatives are
selected with equal probability), and to the just
noticeable difference (JND; i.e., the minimal difference
that can be detected between the alternatives), respec-
tively. The goodness of fit was evaluated from adjusted
r2 values, indicating how much of the psychometric
curves’ variance can be explained by the cumulative
Gaussian function. Across all curves measured in the
present study, the minimum r2 value was 96.7%,
indicating that this model accurately describes our
whole data set.
For each task and each participant, we computed
profiles of response biases as the differences in the
percentages of saccades toward the more and less
rewarded locations. We also computed profiles of
normalized saccadic reaction times toward the more
and less rewarded locations.
Statistical significance of the effects of reward
location and task reversal in the behavioral responses
(proportions of rightward saccades, response biases,
and saccadic reaction times) was assessed with two-way
repeated measure analyses of variance (two-way RM
ANOVA).
Results
Experiment 1: Size discrimination
For each of the 4 sessions (2 reward configurations3
2 reversed tasks; see Figure 2), we computed the mean
psychometric curves across the 27 participants by
reporting the mean percentage of rightward saccades as
a function of the size difference between the right and
left discs, as shown in Figure 3A. Unsurprisingly, as the
size of the right disc increases relative to that of the left
disc, the percentage of rightward saccades increases for
the ‘‘larger’’ task (in blue) while it decreases for the
‘‘smaller’’ task (in green).
Importantly, inspection of the psychometric curves
shows that in the ‘‘larger’’ task, the percentage of
rightward saccades is higher when the high monetary
reward is to the right (filled circles) compared to when
it is to the left (open squares). However, this is not the
case for the ‘‘smaller’’ task, with a high degree of
overlap between the psychometric curves for the two
reward conditions. Two-way RM ANOVA with size
difference and reward configuration as main factors
confirm a significant effect of reward in saccadic
responses for the ‘‘larger’’ task, F(1, 26)¼ 24.46, p ,
104, but not for the ‘‘smaller’’ task, F(1, 26)¼ 1.15, p¼
0.29. As shown in Figure 3B, this leads to a shift of the
PSEs between the two configurations of reward in the
‘‘larger’’ task but not in the ‘‘smaller’’ task (left panel).
The JNDs are largely unaffected in both tasks (right
panel). We provide PSE and JND values in the left
columns of Table 1. By subtracting the percentage of
rightward saccades between the two reward configura-
tions for each task and each participant, we computed
the mean profiles of reward-induced response biases
shown in Figure 3C. The profile is bell-shaped for the
‘‘larger’’ task (upper panel) but flat for the ‘‘smaller’’
task (middle panel), so that the difference of response
biases between the tasks (lower panel) reflects a strong
task-dependence of the response biases. These obser-
vations are confirmed statistically by a two-way RM
ANOVA showing that response biases are a function of
both the size difference, F(7, 182)¼ 4.25, p , 103, and
the task, F(1, 26) ¼ 12.02, p , 102, with a significant
interaction between those factors, F(7, 182)¼ 4.41, p ,
103. Finally, it is interesting to note that the task-
dependency is also observable in the saccadic reaction
times (Figure 3D). The more rewarding location evokes
statistically faster reaction times than the less rewarding
one in the ‘‘larger’’ task: left panel; two-way RM
ANOVA, F(1, 26)¼ 11.82, p , 102; but not in the
‘‘smaller’’ task: right panel; F(1, 26) ¼ 0.29, p ¼ 0.60.
Our data indicates a marked effect of task reversal in
the reward-induced response biases which are signifi-
cant in the ‘‘larger’’ task and virtually absent in the
‘‘smaller’’ task. This is proof that response biases are
the resultant of both perceptual and decisional biases
(see the both biases hypothesis, lower row of Figure 1).
Consequently, objects that are more rewarding are
actually perceived slightly larger than less rewarding
ones, in agreement with the perceptual accentuation
hypothesis.
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Experiment 2: Luminance discrimination
As in the first experiment, we computed mean
psychometric curves across the 27 participants by
reporting the mean percentage of rightward saccades
as a function of the luminance difference between the
right and left discs (Figure 4A). Once again, the
percentage of rightward saccades increases for the
‘‘brighter’’ task (in blue) and decreases for the
‘‘darker’’ task when the right disc becomes increasing
brighter than the left disc. However, a notable
difference with the first experiment is already evident,
since the higher percentage of rightward saccades for
the high monetary reward to the right (filled circles)
compared to the left (open squares) is present for both
reversed tasks. Two-way RM ANOVAs with lumi-
Figure 3. Results of the size discrimination tasks. (A) Mean psychometric curves for the ‘‘larger’’ (in blue) and ‘‘smaller’’ (in green)
tasks and for the higher reward located to the right (filled circles) and to the left (open diamonds). We plot the mean percentage
of rightward saccades as a function of the size difference (D size) between the right and left discs. (B) Related fitting curve
parameters and their 90% CI. Left panel shows the means (l) of the cumulative Gaussian functions, related the PSE. Right panel
shows their widths (r), related to the JND. Values are provided in Table 1, left columns. (C) Mean profiles of response biases as a
function of the size difference for the ‘‘larger’’ (upper panel) and ‘‘smaller’’ (middle panel) tasks, with their difference (lower
panel). Error bars indicate the 90% CI of the mean response biases. (D) Mean normalized saccadic reaction times as a function of
the absolute size difference for the more rewarding (open triangles) and less rewarding (filled triangles) discs. Reaction times for
the ‘‘larger’’ and ‘‘smaller’’ tasks are shown in the left and right panels, respectively. Error bars indicate the 90% CI of the mean
reaction times.
Task Reward PSE JND
Size: Experiment 1
Larger Right 0.72 6 0.21 3.70 6 0.27
Left 0.55 6 0.36 3.95 6 0.42
Smaller Right 0.25 6 0.24 4.26 6 0.29
Left 0.24 6 0.29 4.02 6 0.35
Luminance: Experiment 2
Brighter Right 1.21 6 0.16 7.46 6 0.28
Left 2.08 6 0.26 6.81 6 0.37
Darker Right 2.00 6 0.26 6.90 6 0.38
Left 1.39 6 0.27 7.32 6 0.38
Table 1. Points of subjective equality (PSE) and just noticeable
differences (JND) for the psychometric curves of the size (left
columns) and luminance (right columns) discrimination tasks.
Note: Values are provided with their 90% CI.
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nance difference and reward configuration as main
factors indicate a significant effect of reward for both
the ‘‘brighter,’’ F(1, 26) ¼ 22.00, p , 104, and
‘‘darker,’’ F(1, 26)¼ 15.36, p , 103) tasks. Figure 4B
reinforces this view by showing that the PSE shifts
between the two reward configurations are very
similar for the ‘‘brighter’’ and ‘‘darker’’ tasks, while
the JNDs remain roughly constant (right columns of
Table 1). The mean profiles of reward-induced
response biases (Figure 4C) are similarly bell-shaped
for the ‘‘brighter’’ (upper panel) and ‘‘darker’’ task
(middle panel), leading to a flat profile of response
bias differences between the tasks (lower panel).
These observations are confirmed by a two-way RM
ANOVA showing a highly significant influence of
luminance differences. F(7, 182) ¼ 14.18, p , 1013,
but with no direct, F(1, 26) ¼ 0.06, p ¼ 0.80, or
interactive, F(7, 182) ¼ 0.37, p ¼ 0.92 influence of the
task. Again, the saccadic reaction times (Figure 4D)
confirm the conclusions drawn from the psychometric
curves and response biases, since the more rewarding
location evokes faster reaction times for both the
‘‘brighter’’: left panel; two-way RM ANOVA, F(1, 26)
¼ 9.23, p , 102; and ‘‘darker’’: right panel; F(1, 26)¼
8.68, p , 102) tasks.
Thus, the results of this second experiment indicate
that reward induces behavioural biases in luminance
discrimination tasks, but those biases are immune to
task reversal. Such results are those expected if reward
only affects the decision criterion (see the decision bias
hypothesis, second row of Figure 1). Consequently,
perceptual accentuation does not seem to extend into
the luminance domain: We do not perceive objects
that are more rewarding brighter than less rewarding
ones.
Figure 4. Results of the luminance discrimination tasks. (A) Mean psychometric curves for the ‘‘brighter’’ (in blue) and ‘‘darker’’ (in
green) tasks and for the higher reward located to the right (filled circles) and to the left (open diamonds). (B) Related fitting curve
parameters and their 90% CI. Values are provided in Table 1, right columns. (C) Mean profiles of response biases as a function of the
luminance difference for the ‘‘brighter’’ (upper panel) and ‘‘darker’’ (middle panel) tasks, with their difference (lower panel). Error
bars indicate the 90% CI of the mean response biases. (D) Mean normalized saccadic reaction times as a function of the absolute
luminance difference for the more rewarding (open triangles) and less rewarding (filled triangles) discs. Reaction times for the
‘‘brighter’’ and ‘‘darker’’ tasks are shown in the left and right panels, respectively. Error bars indicate the 90% CI of the mean reaction
times.
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Discussion
The objective of the present study was to re-evaluate
the perceptual accentuation hypothesis (Bruner, 1957),
according to which valuable objects might be seen
larger than they really are. To that end, we developed a
new task-reversal two-alternative forced-choice (TR-
2AFC) paradigm. This paradigm allows us to measure
the participants’ percepts accurately by penalizing
inaccurate response, and disentangle the respective
contribution of the perceptual and decisional levels in
reward-induced response biases. With TR-2AFC,
response biases toward the most rewarding alternative
are expected to be similar between reversed tasks if they
solely reflect a reward optimization strategy (decision
bias), to be opposite if they solely reflect a perceptual
accentuation (perceptual bias), or to reflect the additive
action of these two mechanisms (both biases).
In a first experiment, we found that response biases
differed significantly between the ‘‘larger’’ and ‘‘small-
er’’ tasks, indicating the presence of both decision and
perceptual biases. The existence of a perceptual bias is
important as it supports the idea of a perceptual
accentuation mechanism: Participants perceive objects
that are more rewarding slightly larger than less
rewarding ones. In a second experiment with another
pool of participants, we tested whether this perceptual
accentuation extends into the luminance domain.
Results showed that response biases toward the most
rewarding alternative were similar between the
‘‘brighter’’ and ‘‘darker’’ tasks, arguing for the presence
of a reward-induced decision bias, but without
perceptual bias. Consequently, the perceptual accentu-
ation hypothesis does not apply in the luminance
domain: Participants do not perceive objects that are
more rewarding brighter than less rewarding ones.
Our results are consistent with previous studies
documenting an effect of motivational factors on the
perceived size of visual objects (Bruner & Goodman,
1947; Veltkamp et al., 2008; van Koningsbruggen et al.,
2011; Den Daas et al., 2013). However, it is important
to note that the effect of reward we found is rather
small when compared to those previous studies. Based
on the values provided in Table 1, one can consider that
the overall PSEs (i.e., averaged PSEs between the two
reward configurations) are 0.63% for the ‘‘larger’’ task
([0.55 (0.72)]/2) and ;0% for the ‘‘smaller’’ task
([0.24  (0.25)]/2). Considering that the perceptual
and decisional biases add up in the ‘‘larger’’ task and
cancel each other in the ‘‘smaller’’ task, simple algebraic
calculation tells us that the disc attached to 5 cents of
euro is perceived ;0.32% larger than that attached to 1
cent of a euro. This perceptual accentuation represents
only a fraction of the mean JND (see Table 1), but it
nevertheless produces significant response biases, as
shown in Figure 3. By contrast, previously reported
effects are ;12% in Den Daas et al. (2013), ;25% in
Bruner and Goodman (1947), ;35% in Veltkamp et al.
(2008), ;40% in van Koningsbruggen et al. (2011).
Clearly, it is difficult to imagine how such large
perceptual distortions could fit with the need to form
representations of the outside world that would be
veridical enough to guarantee accurate interactions.
Based on the present results, it is likely that those
previously described effects of reward are in fact mostly
caused by decisional rather than perceptual biases.
Further investigation will need to quantify the contri-
bution of each.
Another difference with the above-mentioned studies
is that we did not compare behavioural responses to
objects of distinct intrinsic values (e.g., coins vs.
wooden discs in Bruner & Goodman, 1947) or from
groups of participants with supposedly distinct moti-
vational states (e.g., food-primed versus flower-primed
dieters in Veltkamp et al., 2008). Our contrast targets
within-subject differences between tasks involving
intrinsically neutral and identical objects (i.e., lumi-
nance-defined discs). As such, we can rule out low-level
differences and familiarity effects with the visual stimuli
(Firestone & Scholl, 2016), but also other between-
group differences, as confounding variables.
However, because we attached the rewarding signal
to a spatial location, we cannot address whether reward
signals act directly on visual perception or through the
mediation of spatial attention (Maunsell, 2004). Re-
cently, Chelazzi and colleagues (2014) found that
reward-location coupling produces a long-lasting in-
crease in the probability of detecting a target at that
particular location; which indicates that reward signals
might durably bias the attentional system (Chelazzi,
Perlato, Santandrea, & Della Libera, 2013). Since
Anton-Erxleben and colleagues (2007) have shown that
participants can perceive attended objects as being
larger, our results in the size domain agree with the idea
that they attend more to the most rewarding location.
However, such explanation does not fit with the fact
that objects are not perceived brighter, while spatial
attention has been shown to increase the apparent
contrast (Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 2004) and luminance
(Tse, 2005) of attended objects.
Assuming that the perceived size of visual objects
and the extent of activation they trigger in early visual
cortex are linked (Murray, Boyaci, & Kersten, 2006;
Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2013), an alternative explanation
posits that coupling a reward to a particular location
induces a cortical overrepresentation of that particular
location. Such cortical remodeling could be mediated
by dopaminergic projections of the ventral tegmental
area (VTA) that have already been shown to promote
cortical remodeling in the auditory cortex (Bao, Chan,
& Merzenich, 2001), to influence activity in early visual
cortex (Serences, 2008; Arsenault, Nelissen, Jarraya, &
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Vanduffel, 2013) and to shape both instrumental and
Pavlovian associations to visual objects (Arsenault,
Rima, Stemmann, & Vanduffel, 2014).
Whatever the underlying mechanisms, our results
reveal that we cannot generalize the influence of reward
to all dimensions of visual perception. This result
echoes recent findings that visual motion does not
affect all dimensions of auditory perception (Maniglia,
Ward, & Grassi, 2017). Evidencing the limits of
contextual influences on perception represents an
important step toward understanding the origins and
functions of such phenomenon (Firestone & Scholl,
2016). The absence of perceptual accentuation in the
luminance domain might be linked to the fact that in
natural conditions, luminance strongly depends on
external factors (time of the day, weather, etc.) so that a
slight accentuation might provide little ecological
advantage. The absence of reward effect on luminance
would logically extend to our experimental conditions,
even if luminance is finely controlled. By contrast,
perceiving behaviorally important objects as slightly
larger than they really are may ease their detection
(Bruner, 1957) and, additionally, may help making
their rewarding status more appealing (Balcetis &
Dunning, 2010) without compromising accurate inter-
actions with those objects.
Keywords: size perception, luminance perception, TR-
2AFC, reward
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